Introduction
In the 1990s, asbestos-related illnesses constitute the most serious category of occupational disease in the UK. The three major diseases caused by asbestos-namely, asbestosis, lung cancer and mesothelioma-now account for about 3,000 deaths each year.1 That number is still rising. According to one estimate, annual male mesothelioma deaths will peak in about the year 2020 with some 2,000 to 3,300 deaths. For the worst affected group-men born in the 1940s-mesothelioma may account for one per cent of all deaths.2 By any standards, asbestos is one of the leading causes of occupationally related deaths in the twentieth century.
Most of us regard asbestos and its related health problems as a "scare" and "epidemic" of fairly recent times-say, from the 1960s. However, the medical community's knowledge about the dangers of asbestos extends almost a hundred years.3 The first diagnosis of a fatal case of asbestosis (a disease then known as fibroid phthisis) was made by a British physician, Dr Montague Murray, in 1899.4 Although this evidence was later submitted to a government enquiry, it did not arouse widespread interest. During the 1920s, however, medical knowledge about the hazards of asbestos grew markedly, as did the industry itself. In 1924, a female worker at the Rochdale factory of Turner & Newall (the leading British asbestos firm) died from "asbestos poisoning", a fact which was confirmed at inquest. When the pathologist involved, Dr William E Cooke, wrote up the case in the British Medical Journal in 1927 (after first publicizing it in 1924), he coined the term by which the disease has since been known-"pulmonary asbestosis" (or simply, asbestosis).5 Following Cooke's report, between 1928 and 1929, at least a dozen separate medical publications carried discussions and articles about the disease.
Knowledge of the carcinogenic potential of asbestos, especially its role in lung cancer, took a little longer to develop. Nevertheless, by the 1940s some doctors and the leading asbestos firms were aware of an unusual rise in the number of lung cancer deaths in asbestos workers.6 In 1955, the lung cancer/asbestos link was confirmed from Turner & Newall data by the epidemiologist, (Sir) Richard Doll. By the late 1950s, another fatal asbestos-related cancer was being identified-mesothelioma. This disease is a highly malignant and painful tumour of the pleura (the lining of the chest) or the peritoneum (the lining of the abdomen). It may take decades to appear (sometimes over forty years), even after relatively limited exposure, but once the disease develops it can kill within a year. Its link with asbestos-which is the only recognized occupational cause of mesotheliomaemerged in 1960 (see Table 1 ).
Even allowing for the long latency of asbestos-related diseases, it seems that government, industry and the medical community have had plenty of advance warning of the dangers. How then is one to account for the current asbestos health problem? 2 R Doll, 'Mortality from lung cancer in asbestos workers', Br. J. ind. Med., 1955, 12: 81-6. 3 J C Wagner, C A Sleggs, and P Marchand, 'Diffuse pleural mesotheliomas and asbestos exposure in the north-western Cape Province', Br J. ind. Med., 1960, 17: 260-71. N.B. Latency periods are approximate, as these can vary widely from months to decades for asbestosis and from a few years to decades for the cancers. For example, in the dusty factories before 1930, asbestosis could develop in under five years. Discovery dates only refer to landmark medical articles. In each disease, the asbestos industry's knowledge pre-dated these publications. 5 See I Selikoff and M Greenberg, 'A landmark cancer. It is also now recognized that asbestos alone case in asbestosis', J. Am. med. Ass., 1991, 265: can initiate lung cancer, without first causing 898-901.
asbestosis. 6 Perhaps half of asbestosis sufferers die of lung Predictably, historians, journalists and medico-legal experts have blamed the asbestos industry. In America, an avalanche of litigation has unearthed a vast archive on the leading asbestos producers, which has provided plenty of evidence of corporate cover-ups on occupational health. Books by Paul Brodeur and particularly by Barry Castleman have seemingly sealed the fate of the asbestos industry beneath a mountain of incriminating documents.7 In the early 1990s, the attack on the industry began anew, when Chase Manhattan Bank took T&N (formerly Turner & Newall) to court, seeking massive damages for the removal of asbestos from its New York skyscraper.8 The case went against Chase in 1995, but not before the bank's lawyers had microfilmed a million T&N records at its Manchester depository.9 This material has armed British plaintiffs and also allowed the media (and historians) to tarnish further the asbestos industry's reputation.'0 These publications are a necessary and welcome counterweight to the propaganda disseminated by powerful business interests. It District of New York, 27 Oct.-6 Dec. 1995. 9 Access to T&N documents was granted under American law's wide-ranging powers of "discovery". The archive is now in the public domain. The present article is based on the Chase microfilm and relevant documents are cited using the Chase reeVframe numbers.
10 David J Jeremy, 'Corporate responses to the emergent recognition of a health hazard in the UK asbestos industry: the case of Turner & Newall, 1920 -1960 ', Bus. econ. Hist., 1995 The involvement of American occupational health physicians with the asbestos industry has been explored in David Ozonoff, 'Failed warnings: asbestos-related disease and industrial medicine', in R Bayer (ed.), The health and safety of workers: case studies in the politics ofprofessional responsibility, New York, Oxford University Press, 1988, pp. 139-218 . Also useful for its American perspective is D Rosner and G Markowitz, Deadly dust: silicosis and the politics ofoccupational disease in twentieth-century America, Princeton University Press, 1991. 12 G B Rooke, 'The Pneumoconiosis Medical Panels ', Occupational Health, August 1983, 35: 356-60. Centres. Still at the heart of medical decision-making in asbestos compensation cases, these groups and their actions have invited recent scrutiny. It Two points should be emphasized about the Asbestosis Scheme. First, it was a pioneering piece of legislation and the UK became the first country officially to recognize asbestosis. Second, the main impetus for the Scheme had come from the government and the enlightened efforts of two health and safety experts. The asbestos industry itself, faced with medical and compensation costs (in addition to capital expenditure on dust prevention), was not an enthusiastic supporter of the new regulations.20 The result was that the Asbestosis Scheme contained some serious weaknesses from the viewpoint of the workers. For example, workers who had left the industry before 1 May 1931 (when the Scheme became effective) were not covered. Even those within the scheme had to claim within three years of leaving the industry-a cruel proviso, given the already known extended latency of asbestos disease.21
Even worse, lobbying by the industry had resulted in the creation of so-called "scheduled areas". These were the sections in the factories where the main manufacturing processes-crushing, carding, spinning, weaving and mattress-making-were conducted. Workers outside these areas were excluded from medical surveillance and often from compensation.22 For example, it was decided that workers making brake-shoes, rubberproofed goods and woven materials would not be at risk of developing asbestosis. The regulations did not apply to clerical staff, either. In particular, laggers and other insulation workers were excluded from the medical scheme. Another exclusion clause effectively excluded those laggers and factory workers whose work in mixing asbestos materials was only "occasional"-defined as no more than eight hours in any week. The net impact of the 1931 scheme at TBA in Rochdale was that about 500 workers were within the scheduled areas. Yet that was only half the workforce, and at the periphery of the Turner & Newall business the medical surveillance in the satellite firms grew even weaker or even non-existent.
These exclusions allowed Turner & Newall, in the words of one of its directors, the possibility of "stretching the regulations to suit our own ends".23 Yet within a year, there were soon doubts that such exclusion clauses were wise. Another study by Merewether showed that asbestos packers, warehousemen and storekeepers were also at risk and he recommended that they should also be included in the Scheme. Scheme covered a slightly wider number of 24 12/20. E R A Merewether (with E L manufacturing processes than the medical scheme.
Middleton), 'Asbestosis: report of inquiry into the This led to a number of anomalies, with some existence of the disease in packers of manufactured workers eligible for compensation (provided they articles ' (1932) . could prove that they were unfit), but denied regular 25 12/59. R H Turner to British Belting & medical examinations. In the lagging trades, for Asbestos Ltd, 7 June 1932. example, the onus was on the employer to provide government, the industry representatives successfully deflected any new proposals, partly by giving a "definite assurance" that the Scheme would be "interpreted broadly, so as to cover all genuine cases of asbestosis occurring in the works."26 On the whole they were well pleased at the outcome. They had succeeded, through the exclusion clauses and the creation of scheduled areas, in drawing an administrative boundary around their product. Unfortunately, it was not a boundary that asbestos fibre respected. Table 2 ).
By the 1960s, diagnosis of asbestosis was made on a history of asbestos exposure plus two positive findings from the following-the presence of basal rales, finger-clubbing, radiological appearances and pulmonary function studies. The criteria used by the Medical Board in the 1930s were less refined, with the emphasis on a chest examination. Merewether believed that even in those days, diagnoses could be made withfair certainty if asbestosis was present in some degree and if both physical and radiological examinations were made. However, X-rays were used sparingly by the Medical Board in the 1930s and 1940s and were only utilized when symptoms became very pronounced or if a worker needed to be suspended (when an X-ray was mandatory). Table 2 shows that in the 1930s only about one in ten workers were X-rayed at their annual examinations.
It was perhaps unfortunate for the worker that clinically diffuse fibrosis was quite compatible with continued work in the industry, especially since most asbestos jobs did 32 Quoted in Castleman, op. cit., note 7 above, p.
36 E R A Merewether, 'A memorandum on 12.
asbestosis', Tubercle, Dec. 1933, 15: 114. 33 37/617-24. C L Sutherland, 'Report on the first 37 As will be apparent from the discussion below, periodic examinations in the asbestos industry' however, a worker did not need to be certified to (1933) .
suffer or die from asbestosis (or cancer). Official 34 Memorandum on the industrial diseases of figures show 148 deaths from asbestosis between silicosis and asbestosis, London, HMSO, 1935 , p. 3. 1931 and 1940 . See A T Doig, 'Asbestos disease', 35 9/485. Commercial Union report, 23 March Health Bulletin, 1968 , 26: 24-9, 26. 1932 The file on David Kerrighan, who died in 1946, also casts doubts on the accuracy of the Medical Board's diagnoses (and also highlights conflicts between various medical authorities). In 1934, after about nine years in the scheduled areas (mostly in fiberizing at Turner's Asbestos Cement works at Trafford), Kerrighan had been told by his local doctor that he was unfit for work in the asbestos industry. Initially, Turner & Newall's medical consultant, W Hirst Bateman, disagreed with this diagnosis: however, he later changed his mind and advised Kerrighan to find an outdoor job. He left TBA, never to work again. In 1936, the regional medical officer certified that Kerrighan was suffering from asbestosis. He was therefore eligible for compensation, if the Medical Board would issue a certificate; but after examining him, they refused. The subsequent post-mortem and inquest on the 46-year-old Kerrighan found that he had died from tuberculosis probably preceded by asbestosis.51
William Clegg, a TBA weaver, was never suspended by the Panel, though bizarrely they advised him to leave the industry due to a long history of bronchitis. He died within a year of his retirement in 1970, with a fatal combination of pneumonia, asbestosis and lung cancer. Joseph P Buckley, in TBA's carding and spinning department, had five "no action" certificates, before his work as a hoist operator took him out of the scheduled areas and beyond the reach of the Medical Board examiners. He retired at sixty-five in 1941 and died in the same year from asbestosis accelerated by tuberculosis. Clearly, it does not appear to have been either government or company policy to follow up workers. Sarah Holt, in carding and spinning, was never suspended by the Board, though a medical examination in 1961 showed she had asbestosis, which killed her in the same year. Rebecca P James, in TBA's spinning and weaving section, had eleven "no actions" up to 1947, yet died from tuberculosis accelerated by asbestosis in 1951.
Even more singular are the details of the Grindrod case in 1933. James Grindrod was a forty-year-old Rochdale weaver, who was told by his local doctor in 1931 to give up his asbestos job because of dyspnoea. However, the Medical Board examined him at the factory in 1933, when a "no action" certificate was issued. He died the same year from pneumonia and asbestosis. At the inquest, the coroner remarked on the "somewhat curious case of a man having been examined by the Medical Board specially set up to deal with cases in the industry, and they came to the conclusion that his condition was satisfactory."52 Coroners were making the same comments some twenty years later. At the inquest of Roberts' carder, Harold Kaye, who died from asbestosis and cancer of the peritoneum (probably mesothelioma) in 1952, the coroner was clearly puzzled that the Medical Board had allowed him to continue working in the industry after they had found in 1932 that he had a "slight degree of fibrosis of the lungs". Kaye was suspended only in 1943, after a further nine "no action" certificates.
These problems in diagnosis evidently continued through the 1950s. Mark Tweedale had worked for thirty-five years in the scheduled areas, having joined TBA in 1920 as a labourer in the carding division. The Medical Board had reached no decision on him, yet by 1955 he was virtually incapacitated with asbestosis. The company found him a job sweeping up in the warehouse, but a departmental memo refers to him finding it 'difficult even to walk about. It is pitiful to see him in his present condition, but he cannot be allowed to Post-Mortems, Inquests and Death Certificates For most suspended workers, death from an asbestos-related disease followed with depressing regularity. The most that their relatives could now hope for was a lump sum settlement following "death by industrial disease". The usual prelude to a settlement was a post-mortem and then the ordeal of an inquest-though not all workers had an inquest, or even a post-mortem, as some were inevitably overlooked by the authorities. Even if a postmortem and inquest were conducted, the outcome was far from certain, as these procedures allowed Turner & Newall the chance fully to defend its position. The company was aided by the fact that diagnosis of asbestos-related disease was a medical minefield of conflicting views between various "experts": these included general practitioners and company doctors, pathologists, and coroners, and even medically unqualified plant managers. This was mainly because asbestosis was always associated with other medical conditions, such as heart failure, stroke, pneumonia, and lung cancer, all of which could cloud the issue. Significantly, other major bronchial conditions-notably tuberculosis-occurred alongside asbestosis.
A growing problem for claimants was the fact that the 1931 regulations had been formulated to deal with asbestosis, the only asbestos-related disease then known. We now know that asbestos exposure can lead to lung cancer (and other cancers). This proved a particular pitfall for claimants, then as now. Turner & Newall workers began dying from asbestosis and lung cancer at least as early as 1932. During the next twenty years, at least 18 TBA employees were found at post-mortem to have had lung cancer (usually combined with asbestosis). From its earliest occurrence in Turner & Newall workers, it proved difficult for the medical experts to decide upon its significance. In none of the early cases of lung cancer/asbestosis did the company admit liability, mainly because the Medical Board did not issue any asbestosis death certificates. For example, in 1938, doctors at the inquest of TBA weaver John Greaves were divided. Although Greaves had been classed as totally disabled by asbestosis and this was confirmed at the post-mortem, the investigation also revealed heart failure and cancer of the lung. When Since mesothelioma did not become a prescribed asbestos disease until 1966, there was little chance that the dependants of such workers would have much success with claims. For example, in 1939 the inquest on Edmund Pilling, a 49-year-old TBA cheese-winder and disintegrator, reported that one of the deceased's lungs was covered with a pleural cancerous growth and that there some asbestosis. But the pathologist gave greater weight to the former, leading the court to decide that asbestosis had neither caused nor accelerated the cancer as a cause of death.65 The Medical Board, in turn, declined to certify death as due to asbestosis and the widow was unable to make a claim.66 No doubt, the company and the Medical Board-had they known of future events-would have argued that it was impossible before 1960 to have known of the mesothelioma risk and so their actions were reasonable. However, this is not a view that has been endorsed in asbestos litigation in the 1990s.67
Turner & Newall's resistance to any negative medical verdict was not pointless. They knew that whatever the coroner's verdict, the dependants still needed a Medical Board death certificate confirming asbestosis as the cause of death. After the costs of the illness and funeral, this was another expense for claimants, who had to pay £2. 71 As noted above, Florence Fairbourn had been frequently examined by the Medical Board, but never suspended. Did the Board feel that they were unable to change their verdict and admit their mistake? The claims' file for Fairbourn mentions a "minor accident" before her death, but this was not raised at the inquest.
72 G H Ashman file. Ashman's employment record was interesting, as he had worked at Turner & Newall for only 16 months. However, his previous employment had been with a brake-lining manufacturers in Bury for 13 years. Did this previous occupation, which was presumably not "scheduled", influence the Medical Board in believing that this worker (who was never suspended) could never have developed significant asbestosis in 16 months? It should be noted that the standard Form A death certificate issued by the Medical Panel included a footnote, which stated that if they were satisfied that asbestosis could not have been contracted in the industry due to the shortness of employment, then they "should certify accordingly".
Medical Panel disagreements with pathologists and inquest verdicts continued into the 1970s. An inquest on Enoch Stockton in 1971 decided that death was due to bronchitis with asbestosis as a contributory factor. The Medical Panel decided the latter was not a factor. In the case of Roberts' sprayer Donald Sharp, the inquest pathologist found that the main cause of death in 1974 was coronary artery disease, though she believed that the man's asbestosis (he had been suspended in 1970 after only about eight years' work) had made him less able to survive a heart attack. The Medical Panel, however, ruled that this was not a factor in the death.73
Yet although the Medical Board occasionally reversed inquest verdicts, it does not appear to have been inclined to revise its own opinions. In the case of David Kerrighan, for example, the inquest in 1946 recorded death by asbestosis and tuberculosis. The Medical Board had declined to suspend him ten years earlier (after he had left work through ill-health) and do not appear to have issued a certificate after his death. Turner & Newall, therefore, made no lump sum payment to the family, which was in severe financial difficulties. Besides debts from Kerrighan's illness, the widow was in poor health herself and she and her four children were living on about £4 a week.74
Conclusion
The Medical Board's involvement with the asbestos industry was part of a pioneering government effort to protect and compensate workers in one of the dangerous trades. In terms of what had preceded it, the work of the Medical Board could not help but ameliorate working conditions in the industry. Yet in other ways, the efforts of the government to protect asbestos workers tell a more depressing tale.
Overall, the Medical Board failed to protect workers as well as it might. Admittedly it was in an invidious position: the medical arrangements scheme was based upon the assumption that by monitoring asbestosis the disease and mortality could be controlled. This proved false and the rationale collapsed entirely with the emergence of mesothelioma, which does not show a clear dose-response relationship. By the time the Medical Board could diagnose and suspend workers the damage had already been done, and perhaps a more active policy would not have had a major impact on mortality, as the underlying problem was dust. Medical examiners were being asked to 
